Shahrzad Majdemeli

 

Shahrzad Majdameli

Iranian Lawyer and International Consultant

 

Shahrzad Majdameli works in the Tollefsen Law International Law Division as an of counsel Iranian lawyer. Her practice is focused on offshore energy, export control, and international business law, with a particular emphasis on Middle Eastern commercial matters.

Ms. Majdameli offers unique skills including 7 years as a licensed Iranian lawyer in Tehran, fluency in Farsi (Iranian) and English, and Arabic reading skills. She has a  LL.M. degree (Master of Laws) in U.S. and Global Business Law from Suffolk University Law School of Boston Massachusetts and a LL.M. in Energy and Environmental Law from George Washington Law School in Washington, D.C.

Ms. Majdameli assists Iranian clients with compliance issues related to sanctions programs administrated by the Department of Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC). She advises Iranians with transfer of assets from Iran to United States and assists with obtaining necessary  licenses from OFAC authorizing otherwise prohibited  transactions.

Ms. Majdameli began her legal career with the International Law Office Dr. Behrooz Akhlaghi & Associates in Tehran, Iran advising numerous multinational corporations with registration, licensure and compliance matters. She has extensive experience in Iranian contract law and in navigating the complexities of the Iranian Civil and Commercial Codes. She has successfully represented clients before Iranian judges at both the trial and appellate level.  She has worked on consultation with the Middle East & North Africa Consultation Association (MENACA) with businesses operating in the Middle East. Ms. Majdameli has experience working on nuclear energy issues under the laws of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Jordan. Shahrzad has worked as a volunteer in Earthpace of Maryland researching shale gas and its environmental implications.

Since 2009, Ms. Majdameli has worked  as volunteer with the World Bank Group of Washington, D.C. providing data and analysis for th the annual World Bank Group research on Iranian business regulations. She also is an expert contributor to the World Bank’s Doing Business Report and the Women, Business and Law Report.

Telephone: 202-999-4430 or any of the other phone numbers of the firm, then extension 614.

Licenses

Attorney at Law, Tehran, Iran, July, 2006

Education

Master of Laws (LL.M.), Energy and Environmental Law, August 2013, George Washington University Law School, Washington, DC. Shahrzad is a visiting scholar at George Washington University Law School assisting the Law School in a project related to environmental compliance and enforcement.

Master of Laws (LL.M.), US and Global Business Law, May 2012, Suffolk University Law School, Boston, MA. The classroom instruction was at Eötvös Loránd University (Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem) in Budapest, Hungary (established 1635).

Bachelor of Laws (LL.B.), Faculty of Law and Political Science, February 2005, University of Alameh Tabatabai, Tehran, Iran.

Prior Experience

Middle East & North Africa Consultation Association (MENACA): Washington, D.C.; Intern, August 2013 – October 2013 – Supporting consultation to firmsdoing business with Middle Eastern economies.

Hogan Lovells US LLP: Washington, D.C.; Contract Attorney, June 2013 to September 2013. Assisting firm on nuclear energy issues under the laws of Saudi Arabia, United Arab Emirates, and Jordan.

Earthpace: Maryland; Consultant, March 2013 – May 2013 Researched shale gas and its environmental implications.

World Bank Group: Washington D.C.; Expert Contributor to Doing Business report, 2009 to present Expert Contributor to Women, Business and the Law report, 2010 to present. Provide data and analysis for annual World Bank Group research on Iranian business regulations.

International Law Office Dr. Behrooz Akhlaghi and Associates, Tehran, Iran; Legal Counsel, June 2006 – March 2012:

  • Experienced in the areas of international trade law, civil law, commercial law, energy law, oil and gas, foreign investment, commercial projects, project finance,  labour law, and litigation

  • Worked on several major projects and cases and cooperated with international law firms, participated in meetings, prepared and drafted legal opinions and gave legal advice

  • Took part in court sessions, prepared the defense bill, and defended client rights in court

  • Completed registration of foreign companies’ branch and/or representative offices before the Corporate Registration Bureau

  • Assisted on airline and shipping cases and various legal issues Law Office of Mr. Saleh Nikbakht, Tehran, Iran

Trainee at Law, October 2003 – January 2009, Tehran; Took part in court sessions, drafted defense bills, took part in negotiation meetings with clients, and handled local cases on issues related to property law, commercial law, and family law

Central Iranian Bar Association, Tehran, Iran; Administrative Assistant, December 2005 – April 2006: Prepared and filed applications of lawyers admitted to the Bar Association Exam

Selected Publications and Presentations

  • “Foreign Investment and Nuclear Energy Issues Under the Law of Saudi Arabia, January, 23, 2014, East King County Bar Association, EKBA-TL-International-Seminar

  • “Foreign exchange transactions in Iran,” Global Share Plans newsletter, January 2011

  • “Labor Law of Iran, Getting the Deal Through,” October 2009

  • “New amendment in Labor Law of Iran,” Gozaresh, March 2009

  • “New Amendment in Labor Law of Iran,” International Business Law Consortium (IBLC) Circular, July 2007

Honors and Awards

  • Certificate for participation in the Seminar on US-Export and Re-Export Controls, US-Sanctions and Embargoes hosted by the International Chamber of Commerce of Austria with cooperation of Baker & McKenzie in November 2011 in Vienna, Austria

 

Waiver Under Washington’s Deed of Trust Act Permitted Where Technical Violations Did Not Harm Plaintiff

Merry v Nationstar –Wn App 324745-III   Background to Deed of Trust In 2007, Sharon Weirich borrowed $205,440 from Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. and executed a Deed of Trust on her real property as security. The deed identified Countrywide as the lender, Landsafe Title of Washington as the Trustee, and the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as “a separate corporation that is acting solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns.” In Bain v. Metropolitan Mortgage Group, 175 Wn.2d 83, 93, 285 P.3d 34 (2012), the Supreme Court of Washington held that the MERS registry’s business practices in creating and transferring beneficial interests with regard to mortgages conflict with the requirements of Washington’s Deed of Trust Act. Beginning in 2011 MERS made a number of assignments and changes in ownership of the note, beneficiary, and trustee using the business practices found to conflict with the Deed of Trust Act.  Following these changes, in October 2012, Northwest Trustee Services, Inc. served Mrs. Weirich with a notice of default on behalf of Bank of America. The same month Ms. Weirich executed a deed of trust to Thomas Merry. This deed of trust secured payment of a $68,000 promissory note. Ms. Weirich also executed a power of attorney and an assignment of legal claims to Mr. Merry. In December 2012, Ms. Weirich received a notice of trustee’s sale informing her that her property would be sold on April 19, 2013 to satisfy her promissory note she originally gave to Countrywide. However, property was not sold on April 19, 2013 and no sale was rescheduled within the 120-day window...

State Supreme Court Finds Washington’s Anti-SLAPP Statute Violates Right to Jury Trial

On May 28, 2015, in Davis v Cox, the Washington State Supreme Court invalidated the Washington Anti-SLAPP statute, RCW 4.24.525. In a unanimous decision, the Court found that section (4)(b) of statute unconstitutionally violates the right to a jury trial. The Court further held that, because every other section in RCW 4.24.525 is dependent upon section (4)(b), the provision is nonseverable and the statute is invalid as a whole. The Washington Anti-SLAPP statute was adopted to address and dissuade “lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances”. A defendant may file a special motion to strike any “action involving public participation and petition”. If the action is found to involve “public participation and petition”, the responding party must “establish by clear and convincing evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim”. If the moving party prevails, the statute contains a provision for a mandatory $10,000 civil penalty and attorney fees for instituting a lawsuit in violation of the statute. The focus of the Court’s decision was the standard of proof placed upon the party responding to a special motion to strike. The responding party must “establish by clear and convincing evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim”. The Court held that the statutory language requires a trial judge to make factual findings and adjudicate the claim. Article I, Section 21 of the Washington State Constitution states, “The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate”. The Court noted that, “At its core, the right of trial by jury guarantees litigants the right to...

Liability for Opinions – Omnicare

Putting Omnicare v Laborers District Counsel in Historical Perspective Omnicare, Inc., et al. v. Laborers District Council Construction Industry Pension Fund et al. Argued November 3, 2014—Decided March 24, 2015 Copy of Decision: 1503-Omnicare Overview The author is a Certified Fraud Examiner and is critical of the common law involving fraud and deceit. Too often the common law allows the taking of money from victims through hyper-technical defenses and faulty logic. Most of this comes from the lack of sympathy the judges have shown for the fraud victim through the history of the development of the law of misrepresentation. One example is the liability for opinions expressed in contrast to facts expressed. The general common law allows the person who takes money through a false expression of opinion to keep the money if speaker believed her opinion. Omnicare, in the context of a registration statement, moves the law in a positive direction by creating liability for a factual omission imbedded in the opinion that would be necessary to correct a false impression. Even though the Supreme Court did not delve in the history of the law, the 2015 Omnicare decision moved the court in a positive direction. The law on opinion testimony as fraudulent may be traced to the 1889 House of Lords decision of Derry v. Peek.1Derry v. Peek, (1889) L.R. 14 App. Cas. 337 (House of Lords) which limited liability for misrepresentation to fact patterns involving scienter. Derry excluded from the definition of “scienter” misrepresentation made with an honest belief that the fact represented was true. Although Derry was seemingly accepted be most United States courts and was adopted by the...

Fraud on the Market

Although the Oregon securities law statute does not on its face require proof of scienter (intent to manipulate, deceive or defraud), the Oregon Court of Appeals read the requirement into the statute if the theory for relief is fraud on the market. Copy of the decision: 150211-Oregon-v-Marsh-&-McLennan In 2003 the legislature amended the Oregon securities law to provide a good faith defense from securities law violations for secondary violators (one who materially aids or is a control person) and to eliminate the defense for sellers and all those in a fraud on the market case. The court reasoned the legislature did not provide a good a good faith defense for those who material aid (or control the issuer) in a fraud on the market case because it assumed that federal securities law applied. That meant the participants are liable because of their culpable intent to defraud and a good faith defense would not make sense. Even though ORS 59.137 does not require scienter by its terms, that is what it means. In a fraud on the market case, Oregon law is the same as federal law under SEC Rule 10b-5. Whatever one thinks of the Oregon Court of Appeals “correcting” the words of the statute, there is a troubling use of language in the case. The court distinguishes fraud on the market from “direct, face-to-face securities transactions”. This is not a valid description of the distinction. Either type of securities transaction can occur in face-to-face situations. Telephones have been available in Oregon for over 100 years and private issuer transactions are often sold over the phone without any face-to-face meeting.  One of the...

Business Liability for Foreseeable Harm

McKown v Simon Property Group, Supreme Court of Washington, March 5, 2015 Decision:  050405-McKnown-v-Simon-Properties After 40 years of practicing U.S. law, I have grown to appreciate the gift we received from our colonizing parent, the common law. The civil law systems suffer from the same rigidity that all statutes impose: one size fits all. The legislature drafts a statute as a solution to a perceived problem not understanding how it might be unjust in a different fact situation. The common law can smooth out these injustices by providing court-made law which reacts to the facts and needs of justice in a particular case. The negatives of the common law system that has decisions made by juries include unpredictability and indefensible awards. The common law has invented tools to minimize the negatives. One of those tools is “foreseeability”. It allows a court to claim that no one could have foreseen the harm so the defendant is not liable. Foreseeability is often the only legal barrier protecting a business from liability. Unfortunately it has proven to be a two-edged sword. The limits of foreseeably was highlighted in McKown v Simon Property Group. On Sunday, November 20, 2005, Dominick S. Maldonado walked into the Tacoma Mall and opened fire on shoppers and mall employees, injuring seven people. Maldonado wore a dark trench coat concealing a MAK-90 rifle and an Intratec Tec-9 pistol, and carried a guitar case filled with ammunition. McKown, an employee at one of the retail stores, tried to stop Maldonado, but was shot and wounded. Simon Property Group owned the Tacoma Mall. Under Washington Law, the Tacoma Mall is liable to McKown...

Failure to Reconvey: Quiet Title Without a Quiet Title Action

What do you do when a seller fails to reconvey the title to property following payment of the loan, then dies? Failure to reconvey puts a cloud on the title that must be quieted. Quiet title actions can be drawn out and expensive. Is there a way to obtain a quiet title without the quiet title action? This article explores four possible tools for obtaining a quiet title outside a traditional quiet title action.

Personal Jurisdiction over Foreign Manufacturers

State v LG Electronics, Wash app, div 1, January 12, 2015:150112 State-v-LG-Electronics There has been ongoing debate in the courts over how much contact foreign manufacturers must have with a state for the state court to assert personal jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers and make the foreign manufactures defend in the state’s courts. The state’s power is constrained by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The foundational case is International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), in which the United States Supreme Court] held that a state may authorize its courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-at-state defendant if the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” The courts have subsequently developed two concepts of personal jurisdiction: (1) General Jurisdiction and (2) Specific Jurisdiction. General jurisdiction “permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant where the defendant’s ‘continuous corporate operations within a state (are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.'” Daimler AG v Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 754-55 (2014). Specific jurisdiction, which since International Shoe “has become the centerpiece of modern jurisdictional theory,” requires that suit arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum. Daimler, 134 S. ct. at 754-55. Specific Jurisdiction requires proof of three elements (1) minimum contacts; (2) action “arises” from minimum contacts; and (3) asserting jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. In State v LG...

Why Organize Early?

Although many company founders are reluctant to take the plunge into creating a corporate entity, often putting this step off for as long as possible, there are some good reasons to consider forming as soon as possible. Holding Period Stock Value The IRS will look at the time between forming and value given for stock at that time, and the company’s value at any financing or liquidity event. Hypothetically, if founders gave $.01 of value for their shares at formation, and they receive a funding round that values the company at $.50/share a week later, they need to be able to convince the IRS in an audit that they created enough value in the company in that one week to warrant the 50x increase in the value of the company. In a situation like this, your company is more than likely to arouse the suspicion that you sold yourselves shares at below market value. The General Partnership Many states, including Washington, have ratified some version of the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA). Washington’s is codified as chapter 25.05 of the Revised Code of Washington. Although the preferred form of entity for most startups is a C corporation, a founder should also be attentive to the provisions of the UPA or its equivalent in his or her state. The reason for this is that many of these acts contain provisions similar to the following from RCW 25.05.055:   (1) Except as otherwise provided in subsection (2) of this section, the association of two or more persons to carry on as co-owners a business for profit forms a partnership, whether or not...

USCIS Issues Fliers About Executive Actions on Immigration

USCIS Issues Fliers About Executive Actions on Immigration Immigration services has just released the first official rules for the President’s new immigration programs. (en Español as well!) They are providing the first concrete rules of what the President proposed last November. Among the highlights: DACA applicants can now be any age, instead of being limited to those born after June 15, 1981. So if you’re 34 or older, you can now apply for DACA as well. Our first solid rules governing who can apply for DAPA (Deferred Action for Parents of American citizens and legal permanent residents), such as their children having to be born before November 20, 2014 and that the parents need to have continuously resided here in the states since January 1, 2010. An expansion of the Provisional Waiver for Unlawful Presence program to people related to lawful permanent residents (Previously, the program only applied to people related to US citizens). A promise to work on the work Visa system to clarify and provide guidance for businesses and applicants. It’s all very exciting news. I can’t wait to learn more about these programs as they start to come online. (Remember: the expanded DACA doesn’t open up for applicants until late- February and DAPA won’t open until late May). In the mean time, talk with a lawyer about what you can do to get ready to...

Note Terms Prevail Over Deed of Trust

Terms of Promissory Note prevail over conflicting terms of Deed of Trust. U.S. Bank National Association, etc. v. Yashouafar et al. 141217-U.-S.-Bank-N-A-v-Yashouafar The terms of a promissory note conflicted with the terms of a deed of trust. The note stated that a prepayment fee was not due until the indebtedness was prepaid. The deed stated that the prepayment fee was due immediately upon acceleration of the note. The deed provided that the terms of the note controlled over those of the deed. The court held that under the clear and explicit terms of the note and deed of trust, as interpreted to give effect to the mutual intention of the parties (California Civil Code sections 1636, 1638, 1639 and 1644), no prepayment fee was due until the actual prepayment of the note’s indebtedness. The court found that the Bank should not have used the date of acceleration of the note in calculating the prepayment fee and that the fee was not due until the note’s indebtedness was prepaid. The terms of the note controlled over those of the deed of trust because the deed provided that they would. If this provision had not been included in the deed of trust, the court may have determined that the prepayment fee would have been due immediately upon acceleration of the note....