Regulatory Compliance: It’s the Little Things…

At some point, nearly every regulatory client has asked me, in a tone of incredulity, why “such a little thing” mattered to a regulating agency. Often the client also asks why a government regulator focuses on the “little guy” when big business appears to skate through regulatory compliance with no issues. The second answer is far simpler but answering it first leads us to part of the answer for the first question. How Big Businesses Treat Regulatory Compliance Big businesses appear to skate through regulatory matters without issues, in a sense, because they are big. Being big, they hire regulatory compliance experts to eliminate issues and quickly correct any problems that do come up. They have support personnel to do the actual work. The proactively address most problems before they get to the point of administrative sanctions or lawsuits. This is not to say big businesses don’t have regulatory problems: many do. Some businesses simply don’t bother to comply and have problems as a result. But most big businesses place an emphasis on regulatory compliance. They recognize that compliance failure can be a business-ending proposition. They place a priority on regulatory compliance. Simply making regulatory errors can put a company under heightened scrutiny, causing more frequent examinations and other disruptive and costly consequences. A series of errors, or repeated errors, may also raise questions that lead to more serious investigations or prosecutions. Each situation drags at a company’s bottom line and pulls focus from the company’s mission and vision. As a result, most big businesses solve their regulatory issues quickly. They hire staff to address compliance. They include it...

Fair Chance – Washington

 Ban-the Box Legislation Fair Chance – Washington h-3695.1-fair-chance-act New legislation beginning to emerge around the country may initially seem counter-intuitive to CFEs. The new laws prohibits employers from asking an applicant about his/her criminal history on a job application or during initial screening and delays that inquiry until after an applicant is determined to be otherwise qualified for the job. There is something in us CFEs that wants to know all but it is becoming clear that many of those caught up in the criminal system have little chance of becoming contributing citizens once they are  branded as a criminal. On November 3, 2015, President Obama signed a ban-the-box (aka “Fair Chance”) executive order addressed to federal agencies (referring to the box to check on an employment application affirming a criminal conviction). According to the National Employment Law Project there are more than 100 cities and counties around the country that have adopted ban-the box rules. Effective October 27, 2015, the New York City Human Right Law was amended by The Fair Chance Act.1N.Y.C. Administrative Code §8-107(11-a) . Guidance which promises vigorous enforcement was published. 2 http://www.nyc.gov/html/cchr/html/coverage/fair-chance-legalguidance.shtml In December of 2015, Portland, Oregon adopted a Fair Chance Law. Under their version of the law, employers are prohibited from inquiring about or even accessing an applicant’s criminal history from any other source before making a “conditional offer of employment.” This is defined as being any offer that is conditioned solely on the results of the criminal background inquiry or some other contingency that is expressly communicated to the applicant at the time of the offer. There currently is a Ban-the-Box bill...

WA Consumer Protection Law applies extraterritorially

SANDRA C. THORNELL, on behalf of herself and an others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v  SEATTLE SERVICE BUREAU, INC. d/b/a) NATIONAL SERVICE BUREAU, INC.,  and STATE FARM MUTUAL  AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,) Defendants. copy of decision: 151210 Thornell v Seattle Service Bureau “This case involves two certified questions from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. First, we are asked to determine whether the Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA), chapter 19.86 RCW allows a cause of action for a plaintiff residing outside Washington to sue a Washington corporate defendant for allegedly deceptive acts. Second, we are asked to determine whether the CPA supports a cause of action for an out-of-state plaintiff to sue an out-of-state defendant for the allegedly deceptive acts of its instate agent. The United States District Court noted an absence of Washington case law providing guidance on these issues. We answer both certified questions in the affirmative.” “We first focus on the definition of “commerce” – “any commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of the state of Washington.” RCW 19.86.010(2) (emphasis added). The definition of “commerce” does not describe who may sue under the CPA but rather the scope of the acts and practices the CPA is designed to prevent. Defendants argue that the definition of “commerce” should not be  understood to allow a claim for an unfair or deceptive practice on behalf of people not “of the state of Washington.” Such a reading, however, would require us to give no effect to the words “indirectly affecting.” In order to give effect to the phrase “indirectly affecting,” claims are not limited to those only having...

Collapse of building for insurance purposes

QUEEN ANNE PARK HOMEOWNERS  ASSOCIATION, a Washington non-profit corporation,  v.   STATE FARM FIRE AND CASUALTY  COMPANY, a foreign insurance company, June 18 2015 Copy of Case 2015-Queen-Anne-Park-v-State-Farm The Washington Supreme Court held that collapse means substantial impairment of structural integrity. The dissent argued collapse means “collapse”. Part or all of the building fell down. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals asked the court to decide this question: What does “collapse” mean under Washington law in an insurance policy that insures “accidental direct physical loss involving collapse,” subject to the policy’s terms, conditions, exclusions, and other provisions, but does not define “collapse,” except to state that “collapse does not include settling, cracking, shrinking, bulging or expansion?” The insured building was found to have “hidden decay” that  had substantially impaired the walls’ ability to resist lateral loads according to the owner’s inspector. Hidden decay that caused a collapse was expressly covered by the policy. “Construction of an insurance policy is a question of law for the courts, the policy is construed as a whole, and the policy ‘should be given a fair, reasonable, and sensible construction as would be given to the contract by the average person purchasing insurance.”‘1Queen City Farms, Inc. v. Cent. Nat’l Ins. Co. of Omaha, 126 Wn.2d 50, 65, 882 P.2d 703 (1994) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Grange Ins. Co. v. Brosseau, 113 Wn.2d 91, 95,776 P.2d 123 (1989) ). The court held that “collapse” is ambiguous because it is subject to more than one reasonable interpretation. In this case there were two conflicting rules of interpretation: 1) plain meaning versus 2) favor the insured if...

Waiver Under Washington’s Deed of Trust Act Permitted Where Technical Violations Did Not Harm Plaintiff

Merry v Nationstar –Wn App 324745-III   Background to Deed of Trust In 2007, Sharon Weirich borrowed $205,440 from Countrywide Home Loans, Inc. and executed a Deed of Trust on her real property as security. The deed identified Countrywide as the lender, Landsafe Title of Washington as the Trustee, and the Mortgage Electronic Registration Systems, Inc. (MERS) as “a separate corporation that is acting solely as a nominee for Lender and Lender’s successors and assigns.” In Bain v. Metropolitan Mortgage Group, 175 Wn.2d 83, 93, 285 P.3d 34 (2012), the Supreme Court of Washington held that the MERS registry’s business practices in creating and transferring beneficial interests with regard to mortgages conflict with the requirements of Washington’s Deed of Trust Act. Beginning in 2011 MERS made a number of assignments and changes in ownership of the note, beneficiary, and trustee using the business practices found to conflict with the Deed of Trust Act.  Following these changes, in October 2012, Northwest Trustee Services, Inc. served Mrs. Weirich with a notice of default on behalf of Bank of America. The same month Ms. Weirich executed a deed of trust to Thomas Merry. This deed of trust secured payment of a $68,000 promissory note. Ms. Weirich also executed a power of attorney and an assignment of legal claims to Mr. Merry. In December 2012, Ms. Weirich received a notice of trustee’s sale informing her that her property would be sold on April 19, 2013 to satisfy her promissory note she originally gave to Countrywide. However, property was not sold on April 19, 2013 and no sale was rescheduled within the 120-day window...

State Supreme Court Finds Washington’s Anti-SLAPP Statute Violates Right to Jury Trial

On May 28, 2015, in Davis v Cox, the Washington State Supreme Court invalidated the Washington Anti-SLAPP statute, RCW 4.24.525. In a unanimous decision, the Court found that section (4)(b) of statute unconstitutionally violates the right to a jury trial. The Court further held that, because every other section in RCW 4.24.525 is dependent upon section (4)(b), the provision is nonseverable and the statute is invalid as a whole. The Washington Anti-SLAPP statute was adopted to address and dissuade “lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances”. A defendant may file a special motion to strike any “action involving public participation and petition”. If the action is found to involve “public participation and petition”, the responding party must “establish by clear and convincing evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim”. If the moving party prevails, the statute contains a provision for a mandatory $10,000 civil penalty and attorney fees for instituting a lawsuit in violation of the statute. The focus of the Court’s decision was the standard of proof placed upon the party responding to a special motion to strike. The responding party must “establish by clear and convincing evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim”. The Court held that the statutory language requires a trial judge to make factual findings and adjudicate the claim. Article I, Section 21 of the Washington State Constitution states, “The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate”. The Court noted that, “At its core, the right of trial by jury guarantees litigants the right to...