by John J. Tollefsen | Mar 5, 2015 | Blog, Business Law, Business Torts WA, Real Estate WA
McKown v Simon Property Group, Supreme Court of Washington, March 5, 2015 Decision: 050405-McKnown-v-Simon-Properties After 40 years of practicing U.S. law, I have grown to appreciate the gift we received from our colonizing parent, the common law. The civil law systems suffer from the same rigidity that all statutes impose: one size fits all. The legislature drafts a statute as a solution to a perceived problem not understanding how it might be unjust in a different fact situation. The common law can smooth out these injustices by providing court-made law which reacts to the facts and needs of justice in a particular case. The negatives of the common law system that has decisions made by juries include unpredictability and indefensible awards. The common law has invented tools to minimize the negatives. One of those tools is “foreseeability”. It allows a court to claim that no one could have foreseen the harm so the defendant is not liable. Foreseeability is often the only legal barrier protecting a business from liability. Unfortunately it has proven to be a two-edged sword. The limits of foreseeably was highlighted in McKown v Simon Property Group. On Sunday, November 20, 2005, Dominick S. Maldonado walked into the Tacoma Mall and opened fire on shoppers and mall employees, injuring seven people. Maldonado wore a dark trench coat concealing a MAK-90 rifle and an Intratec Tec-9 pistol, and carried a guitar case filled with ammunition. McKown, an employee at one of the retail stores, tried to stop Maldonado, but was shot and wounded. Simon Property Group owned the Tacoma Mall. Under Washington Law, the Tacoma Mall is liable to McKown...
by John J. Tollefsen | Oct 30, 2014 | Blog, Business Law, Business Torts WA, Consumer Protection WA
Lyons v U.S. Bank National Association (WA SC October 30, 2014) Decision: 141030-Lyons-v-US-Bank Lyons defaulted on the note secured by a trust deed on her home. In October 2011, Lyons filed bankruptcy, and in January 2012 she applied for a loan modification with Wells Fargo. On March 30, 2012, while Lyons was waiting for a response regarding her application for a modification, she received a notice of trustee’s sale from NWTS informing her that her property was scheduled to be sold on July 6, 2012. On April 5,2012, Wells Fargo told Lyons’ attorney that the in-house modification had been approved. On April 19,2012, Lyons received the letter confirming the modification. The terms required her to pay $10,000 by May 1,2012. Wells Fargo informed Lyons they would discontinue the sale upon receipt of this payment. She paid this amount to Wells Fargo as required. However, on March 29, 2012, Wells Fargo had sold Lyons’ loan to U.S. Bank National Association as trustee for Stanwich Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2012-3 with Carrington Mortgage Services LLC as the new servicer of the loan. This was to become effective on May 1,2012. NWTS received notice of the sale and service release on April 12,2012. Lyons received notice of this sale on April 26, 2012. On April 26, 2012, Lyons’ attorney spoke with a representative of NWTS to inform it that Wells Fargo no longer had any beneficial interest in the loan after the sale, that Carrington was the new servicer of the loan, and that Lyons had received a loan modification so she was no longer in default. On June 11, 2012, Lyons’...
by John J. Tollefsen | Aug 22, 2014 | Blog, Business Torts WA, Consumer Protection WA, Washingon State
CPA Claims Assignable No Exception for Fraud under Economic Loss Rule Duty of Good Faith Does Not Create Warranty Carlile v. Harbour Homes, Inc., 147 Wn. App. 193, 194 P.3d 280, (Wash.App. Div. 1 Oct 20, 2008) (NO. 61419-3-I) Homes are purchased by contract. Washington law denies the home purchaser the right to sue for torts like negligence under the “economic loss rule.” The rule limits the parties to their contract remedies because “tort law is not intended to compensate parties for losses suffered as a result of a breach of duties assumed only by agreement.” Alejandre v. Bull, 159 Wash.2d 674, 681, 682, 153 P.3d 864 (2007). An exception to the rule was created for fraudulent concealment claims. In Carlile, the court was asked to create an exception for intentional misrepresentation (common law fraud). The two tort claims have distinct elements. A claim for fraudulent concealment requires a plaintiff to show: (1) [that] the residential dwelling has a concealed defect; 2) the vendor has knowledge of the defect; (3)the defect presents a danger to the property, health, or life of the purchaser; (4) the defect is unknown to the purchaser; and (5) the defect would not be disclosed by a careful, reasonable inspection by the purchaser. The nine elements of intentional misrepresentation (common law fraud) are: (1) representation of an existing fact; (2) materiality; (3) falsity; (4) the speaker’s knowledge of its falsity; (5) intent of the speaker that it should be acted upon by the plaintiff; (6) plaintiff’s ignorance of its falsity; (7) plaintiff’s reliance on the truth of the representation; (8) plaintiff’s right to rely...
by John J. Tollefsen | Jun 27, 2012 | Bankruptcy, Blog, Business Torts WA, Federal Law, Fraud, Fraud WA, Washingon State
Fraudulent Transfers in Washington State Transfers without adequate consideration or gifts can be overturned as fraudulent in certain circumstances. This article discusses breaking asset protection trusts and other devices to avoid creditors Briefly transferring house to wife to obtain loan is fraudulent transfer Most Asset Protection Schemes Do Not Work The Internet is replete with websites touting asset protection schemes. What they do not reveal is that they are unlikely to work. Most states have statutes that protect creditors from asset protection schemes through a variety of tools. Unless the trust does not benefit the debtor, it is unlikely to serve its purpose. This article discusses the various applicable statutes in Washington State. Understanding trusts An asset protection trust is an entity created by and recognized by court-made law (common law). “Asset protection” is a label applied to a common law trust specifying its purpose but not describing a unique entity. Some trusts, like Massachusetts Business Trusts, are entities chartered by Washington’s Secretary of State in a process similar to the creation of a corporation or limited liability company. Asset protection trusts generally rely on the non-chartered and therefore more secret trusts created under common law. Modern trust law is primarily the product of centuries of decisions starting from the 13th century in the courts of equity (Court of the Chancery) of England. Trusts are now internationally recognized by the Hague Convention on the Law Applicable to Trusts and on their Recognition effective January 1, 1992. An intentionally established trust (“express” trust) involves at least three persons: 1) the settlor(s) or trustor(s) who transfers property in trust to the...
by John J. Tollefsen | Jul 31, 2011 | Blog, Business Torts WA, Civil Litigation, Civil Litigation WA, Consumer Protection WA, Fraud, Washingon State
Unjust Enrichment – Washington State Law The terms “restitution” and “unjust enrichment” are the modern designations for the older “quasi contracts” terminology.127 WAPRAC § 5.51 The Washington court has adopted the unjust enrichment terminology, but continues to use the quasi contractual terminology interchangeably: “Quasi contracts” are not true contracts but are obligations created by the law when money or property has been placed in one person’s possession under such circumstances that in equity and good conscience, he ought not to retain it. [Citation omitted.] Thus, the substance of an action for unjust enrichment lies in a promise, implied by law, that one will render to the person entitled thereto that which in equity and good conscience, belongs to the latter. At common law, such actions are brought under the principles of assumpsit, and where the cause of action arises from a tortious wrong, it is the general rule, whether or not there be an express contract, that the injured party may waive the tort and sue in assumpsit, in which case the law will imply a contract on the part of the tort-feasor to pay the injured party a just remuneration for the damages suffered to his property.2Bill v. Gattavara, 34 Wash. 2d 645, 209 P.2d 457 (1949), (4-1 decision). In unjust enrichment terms, two basic elements must be established in quasi-contractual actions: the person receiving a benefit (such as money) must be unjustly enriched, and the party conferring the benefit must not be a volunteer.3Lynch v. Deaconess Medical Center, 113 Wash. 2d 162, 776 P.2d 681 (1989); Trane Co. v. Randolph Plumbing & Heating, 44 Wash. App. 438,...
by John J. Tollefsen | Feb 21, 2011 | Blog, Business Torts WA, Consumer Protection WA, Fraud, Securities Law WA
Criminal Profiteering: Washington State’s “Baby” RICO Act The Criminal Profiteering Act of 1985 is Washington State’s version of the federal RICO law.1State v. Thomas, 103 Wash. App. 800, 14 P.3d 854 (2000); Bowcutt v. Delta North Star Corp., 95 Wash. App. 311, 976 P.2d 643 (1999) (trial court erred in failing to provide full scope of equitable remedies authorized by Washington statute). It provides civil penalties and remedies for a variety of criminal activities. “Criminal profiteering” is defined to include the commission, or attempted commission, for financial gain, of any one of a number of crimes listed in the statute.2These include many violent felonies, as well as felonies relating to gambling, drugs, pornography, prostitution, extortion, and securities fraud. The act provides that a “pattern of criminal profiteering activity” means engaging in at least three acts of criminal profiteering within a five-year period. To constitute a “pattern,” the three acts must have the same or similar intent, results, accomplices, principals, victims or methods of commission, or be otherwise interrelated by distinguishing characteristics including a nexus to the same enterprise, and must not be isolated events. A “pattern” of profiteering is usually required before any of the special civil remedies apply.3Winchester v. Stein, 135 Wash. 2d 835, 852, 959 P.2d 1077, 1083 (1998). See 16A WAPRAC § 26.51. There are many similarities between the Washington statute and the federal statute, and as a result, Washington courts look to the case law interpreting the federal statute as a guide to interpretation of the Washington statute.4Id. However, the Washington statute has been characterized as being somewhat narrower. For example, whereas the federal statute...
