by Justin Tollefsen | May 29, 2015 | Attorneys, Blog, Civil Litigation WA, Constitution WA
On May 28, 2015, in Davis v Cox, the Washington State Supreme Court invalidated the Washington Anti-SLAPP statute, RCW 4.24.525. In a unanimous decision, the Court found that section (4)(b) of statute unconstitutionally violates the right to a jury trial. The Court further held that, because every other section in RCW 4.24.525 is dependent upon section (4)(b), the provision is nonseverable and the statute is invalid as a whole. The Washington Anti-SLAPP statute was adopted to address and dissuade “lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances”. A defendant may file a special motion to strike any “action involving public participation and petition”. If the action is found to involve “public participation and petition”, the responding party must “establish by clear and convincing evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim”. If the moving party prevails, the statute contains a provision for a mandatory $10,000 civil penalty and attorney fees for instituting a lawsuit in violation of the statute. The focus of the Court’s decision was the standard of proof placed upon the party responding to a special motion to strike. The responding party must “establish by clear and convincing evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim”. The Court held that the statutory language requires a trial judge to make factual findings and adjudicate the claim. Article I, Section 21 of the Washington State Constitution states, “The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate”. The Court noted that, “At its core, the right of trial by jury guarantees litigants the right to...
by John J. Tollefsen | Feb 6, 2015 | Blog, Civil Litigation WA, Constitution WA, Constitutional US, Consumer Protection WA
State v LG Electronics, Wash app, div 1, January 12, 2015:150112 State-v-LG-Electronics There has been ongoing debate in the courts over how much contact foreign manufacturers must have with a state for the state court to assert personal jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers and make the foreign manufactures defend in the state’s courts. The state’s power is constrained by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The foundational case is International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), in which the United States Supreme Court] held that a state may authorize its courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-at-state defendant if the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” The courts have subsequently developed two concepts of personal jurisdiction: (1) General Jurisdiction and (2) Specific Jurisdiction. General jurisdiction “permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant where the defendant’s ‘continuous corporate operations within a state (are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.'” Daimler AG v Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 754-55 (2014). Specific jurisdiction, which since International Shoe “has become the centerpiece of modern jurisdictional theory,” requires that suit arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum. Daimler, 134 S. ct. at 754-55. Specific Jurisdiction requires proof of three elements (1) minimum contacts; (2) action “arises” from minimum contacts; and (3) asserting jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. In State v LG...
by Justin Tollefsen | Nov 14, 2014 | Administrative WA, Attorneys, Blog, Constitution WA, Employment Law WA, Tollefsen Law, Washingon State
Decision: 141103 – City of Medina v Skinner 711571 On November 3, the Court of Appeals, Division I held that the Civil Service Commission’s Back Pay Award Exceeded Its Authority when it awarded back pay and benefits after it had modifed Officer Skinner’s discipline. Lieutenant Roger Skinner was terminated from his position with the City of Medina Police Department for a violation of department standards. Skinner appealed his dismissal to the City’s Civil Service Commission. The Commission found that the City acted in good faith and with just cause when it disciplined Skinner. It also found that the City did not have cause to terminate Skinner. The Commission ordered the City to set aside Skinner’s discharge. Instead of discharge, the Commission ordered Skinner to be suspended without pay and benefits for sixty days. It also ordered Skinner to be demoted to patrol officer effective the last day of his suspension and ordered the City to pay Skinner back pay and benefits as a patrol officer from the end of the suspension until his health precluded his return to work. The Commission retained jurisdiction over the matter until resolution of what it called the “remedy phase.” It said that it would set a hearing as to implementation of its order if the parties could not resolve it through stipulation. The City moved for partial reconsideration, challenging the Commission’s award of back pay and benefits. The Commission denied the motion stating that issues regarding the offset of Skinner’s wages or earnings after his suspension would be addressed during the remedy phase. The City applied for a statutory writ of review under Chapter 7.16 RCW, arguing...
by John J. Tollefsen | Oct 2, 2014 | Blog, Civil Litigation WA, Constitution WA, Constitutional US
Failla v FixtureOne Corporation (SC WA, October 2, 2014 Decision: 141002-Failla-v-FixtureOne In a dispute over unpaid wages, Washington State’s Supreme Court held that personal jurisdiction can exist over an out of state officer who had never set foot in Washington State. “[E]mploying a Washington resident to perform work in Washington constitutes the “transaction of any business within this state” under RCW 4.28.185( 1)( a)”. “we do not hold today that any corporate officer of a nonresident corporation may be subject to the state’s jurisdiction. Rather, Schutz was the officer directly responsible for the hiring, firing, promotion, and payment of Failla’s wages”. Schultz was sued under RCW 49.52.050 and .070. Together these statutes create a cause of action against [a]ny employer or officer, vice principal or agent ojany employer . .. who … [w]ilfully and with intent to deprive the employee of any part of his or her wages, [pays] any employee a lower wage than the wage such employer is obligated to pay such employee by any statute, ordinance, or contract. RCW 49.52.050(2) The sole dissent argued: “The United States Supreme Court has “consistently rejected attempts to satisfy the defendant-focused ‘minimum contacts’ inquiry by demonstrating contacts between the plaintiff (or third parties) and the forum State.” ld. (emphasis added). In fact, no matter how “significant the plaintiff’s contacts with the forum may be,” they cannot be decisive when determining whether the defendant had minimum contacts. ld. As described above, the employer’s only contacts with Washington were his contacts with the plairitiff. He took no actions related to this state. The majority’s inquiry is focused on the defendant’s contact with the plaintiff,...
