by John J. Tollefsen | Dec 12, 2015 | Blog, Civil Litigation WA, Consumer Protection WA, Contracts WA, Employment Law WA, Fraud WA, Securities Law WA
SANDRA C. THORNELL, on behalf of herself and an others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v SEATTLE SERVICE BUREAU, INC. d/b/a) NATIONAL SERVICE BUREAU, INC., and STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,) Defendants. copy of decision: 151210 Thornell v Seattle Service Bureau “This case involves two certified questions from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. First, we are asked to determine whether the Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA), chapter 19.86 RCW allows a cause of action for a plaintiff residing outside Washington to sue a Washington corporate defendant for allegedly deceptive acts. Second, we are asked to determine whether the CPA supports a cause of action for an out-of-state plaintiff to sue an out-of-state defendant for the allegedly deceptive acts of its instate agent. The United States District Court noted an absence of Washington case law providing guidance on these issues. We answer both certified questions in the affirmative.” “We first focus on the definition of “commerce” – “any commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of the state of Washington.” RCW 19.86.010(2) (emphasis added). The definition of “commerce” does not describe who may sue under the CPA but rather the scope of the acts and practices the CPA is designed to prevent. Defendants argue that the definition of “commerce” should not be understood to allow a claim for an unfair or deceptive practice on behalf of people not “of the state of Washington.” Such a reading, however, would require us to give no effect to the words “indirectly affecting.” In order to give effect to the phrase “indirectly affecting,” claims are not limited to those only having...
by John J. Tollefsen | Feb 6, 2015 | Blog, Civil Litigation WA, Constitution WA, Constitutional US, Consumer Protection WA
State v LG Electronics, Wash app, div 1, January 12, 2015:150112 State-v-LG-Electronics There has been ongoing debate in the courts over how much contact foreign manufacturers must have with a state for the state court to assert personal jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers and make the foreign manufactures defend in the state’s courts. The state’s power is constrained by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The foundational case is International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), in which the United States Supreme Court] held that a state may authorize its courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-at-state defendant if the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” The courts have subsequently developed two concepts of personal jurisdiction: (1) General Jurisdiction and (2) Specific Jurisdiction. General jurisdiction “permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant where the defendant’s ‘continuous corporate operations within a state (are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.'” Daimler AG v Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 754-55 (2014). Specific jurisdiction, which since International Shoe “has become the centerpiece of modern jurisdictional theory,” requires that suit arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum. Daimler, 134 S. ct. at 754-55. Specific Jurisdiction requires proof of three elements (1) minimum contacts; (2) action “arises” from minimum contacts; and (3) asserting jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. In State v LG...
by John J. Tollefsen | Oct 30, 2014 | Blog, Business Law, Business Torts WA, Consumer Protection WA
Lyons v U.S. Bank National Association (WA SC October 30, 2014) Decision: 141030-Lyons-v-US-Bank Lyons defaulted on the note secured by a trust deed on her home. In October 2011, Lyons filed bankruptcy, and in January 2012 she applied for a loan modification with Wells Fargo. On March 30, 2012, while Lyons was waiting for a response regarding her application for a modification, she received a notice of trustee’s sale from NWTS informing her that her property was scheduled to be sold on July 6, 2012. On April 5,2012, Wells Fargo told Lyons’ attorney that the in-house modification had been approved. On April 19,2012, Lyons received the letter confirming the modification. The terms required her to pay $10,000 by May 1,2012. Wells Fargo informed Lyons they would discontinue the sale upon receipt of this payment. She paid this amount to Wells Fargo as required. However, on March 29, 2012, Wells Fargo had sold Lyons’ loan to U.S. Bank National Association as trustee for Stanwich Mortgage Loan Trust Series 2012-3 with Carrington Mortgage Services LLC as the new servicer of the loan. This was to become effective on May 1,2012. NWTS received notice of the sale and service release on April 12,2012. Lyons received notice of this sale on April 26, 2012. On April 26, 2012, Lyons’ attorney spoke with a representative of NWTS to inform it that Wells Fargo no longer had any beneficial interest in the loan after the sale, that Carrington was the new servicer of the loan, and that Lyons had received a loan modification so she was no longer in default. On June 11, 2012, Lyons’...
by John J. Tollefsen | Sep 5, 2014 | Blog, Consumer Protection WA, Real Estate WA
Filmore LLLP v. Unit Owners Ass’n of Centre Pointe Condo., 2014 Wash. App. LEXIS 2181 (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 2, 2014) Decision: 140902-Filmore-v-Unit-Owners The condominium’s declaration required more than 67% of the votes for amendments. The Washington condominium statute requires 90% majority to change the “use” of condominiums. The legal question was whether changing the leasing rights of condominium owners was a change in use. RCW 64.34.264, entitled “Amendment of declaration,” provides in relevant part: (1) Except in cases of amendments that may be executed by a declarant under RCW 64.34.232(6) or 64.34.236; the association under RCW 64.34.060, 64.34.220(5),64.34.228(3),64.34.244(1),64.34.248, or 64.34.268(8); or certain unit owners under RCW 64.34.228(2), 64.34.244(1), 64.34.248(2), or 64.34.268(2), and except as limited by subsection (4) of this section, the declaration, including the survey maps and plans, may be amended only by vote or agreement of unit owners of units to which at least sixty-seven percent of the votes in the association are allocated, or any larger percentage the declaration specifies: PROVIDED, That the declaration may specify a smaller percentage only if all of the units are restricted exclusively to nonresidential use. (4) Except to the extent expressly permitted or required by other provisions of this chapter, no amendment may create or increase special declarant rights, increase the number of units. change the boundaries of any unit, the allocated interests of a unit, or the uses to which any unit is restricted, in the absence of the vote or agreement of the owner of each unit particularly affected and the owners of units to which at least ninety percent of the votes in the association are...
by John J. Tollefsen | Aug 28, 2014 | Administrative WA, Blog, Consumer Protection WA, Washingon State
Gray v Suttell & Associates (Supreme Court WA, Aug 28, 2014) Copy of the Opinion: 140828 WSC Gray v Suttell Over a thousand collection lawsuits were filed in the name of the purchaser of the debt. The Supreme Court held that was unlawful if the buyer did not have a debt collection license from Washington State. The court included the following industry analysis in its opinion. Since the enactment of the WCAA, the debt collection industry has grown and changed to keep up with the increasing amount of consumer delinquent debt. TheFederal Trade Commission noted that ‘”[t]he most significant change in the debt collection business in recent years has been the advent and growth of debt buying.”‘FED. TRADE COMM’N, THE STRUCTURE AND PRACTICES OF THE DEBT BUYING INDUSTRY (2013) (alteration in original) (quoting FED. TRADE COMM’N, COLLECTING CONSUMER DEBTS: THE CHALLENGE OF CHANGE 13 n.1 (2009)). Although a relatively new industry, by 2007, the debt collection industry employed over 200,000 people and reported annual revenue of $58 billion from consumer collections. RICK JURGENS & ROBERT J. HOBBS, NAT’L CONSUMER LAW CTR., THE DEBT MACHINE, HOW THE COLLECTION INDUSTRY HOUNDS CONSUMERS AND OVERWHELMS COURTS 5 (201 0). A “debt buyer” is an entity or individual that purchases delinquent or charged-off debts from a creditor, usually for a fraction of the face value of the debt, and then takes some action to collect on those claims. H.B. REP. on SUBSTITUTE H.B. 1822, at 2, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess. (Wash. 2013). There is growing concern that collection practices employed by debt buyers are harmful to consumers. A legislative staff summary of public...
by John J. Tollefsen | Aug 22, 2014 | Blog, Business Torts WA, Consumer Protection WA, Washingon State
CPA Claims Assignable No Exception for Fraud under Economic Loss Rule Duty of Good Faith Does Not Create Warranty Carlile v. Harbour Homes, Inc., 147 Wn. App. 193, 194 P.3d 280, (Wash.App. Div. 1 Oct 20, 2008) (NO. 61419-3-I) Homes are purchased by contract. Washington law denies the home purchaser the right to sue for torts like negligence under the “economic loss rule.” The rule limits the parties to their contract remedies because “tort law is not intended to compensate parties for losses suffered as a result of a breach of duties assumed only by agreement.” Alejandre v. Bull, 159 Wash.2d 674, 681, 682, 153 P.3d 864 (2007). An exception to the rule was created for fraudulent concealment claims. In Carlile, the court was asked to create an exception for intentional misrepresentation (common law fraud). The two tort claims have distinct elements. A claim for fraudulent concealment requires a plaintiff to show: (1) [that] the residential dwelling has a concealed defect; 2) the vendor has knowledge of the defect; (3)the defect presents a danger to the property, health, or life of the purchaser; (4) the defect is unknown to the purchaser; and (5) the defect would not be disclosed by a careful, reasonable inspection by the purchaser. The nine elements of intentional misrepresentation (common law fraud) are: (1) representation of an existing fact; (2) materiality; (3) falsity; (4) the speaker’s knowledge of its falsity; (5) intent of the speaker that it should be acted upon by the plaintiff; (6) plaintiff’s ignorance of its falsity; (7) plaintiff’s reliance on the truth of the representation; (8) plaintiff’s right to rely...
