WA Consumer Protection Law applies extraterritorially

SANDRA C. THORNELL, on behalf of herself and an others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v  SEATTLE SERVICE BUREAU, INC. d/b/a) NATIONAL SERVICE BUREAU, INC.,  and STATE FARM MUTUAL  AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,) Defendants. copy of decision: 151210 Thornell v Seattle Service Bureau “This case involves two certified questions from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. First, we are asked to determine whether the Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA), chapter 19.86 RCW allows a cause of action for a plaintiff residing outside Washington to sue a Washington corporate defendant for allegedly deceptive acts. Second, we are asked to determine whether the CPA supports a cause of action for an out-of-state plaintiff to sue an out-of-state defendant for the allegedly deceptive acts of its instate agent. The United States District Court noted an absence of Washington case law providing guidance on these issues. We answer both certified questions in the affirmative.” “We first focus on the definition of “commerce” – “any commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of the state of Washington.” RCW 19.86.010(2) (emphasis added). The definition of “commerce” does not describe who may sue under the CPA but rather the scope of the acts and practices the CPA is designed to prevent. Defendants argue that the definition of “commerce” should not be  understood to allow a claim for an unfair or deceptive practice on behalf of people not “of the state of Washington.” Such a reading, however, would require us to give no effect to the words “indirectly affecting.” In order to give effect to the phrase “indirectly affecting,” claims are not limited to those only having...

Principles of contract interpretation

Washington State Law – Principles of Contract Interpretation Viking Bank v. Firgrove Commons 3, LLC, 2014 Wash. App. LEXIS 2277 (Division II, Wash. Ct. App.Sept. 16, 2014) Decision: 140916-II-Viking-Bank-v-Firgrove The court refused to imply a promise to pay management fees into the triple net provision of a commercial lease. These facts are unusual because standard commercial leases specifically list management fees in the description of costs passed on to tenants. This case is useful for the following statement of the principles of contract interpretation applicable to Washington State: “The primary objective in contract interpretation is to ascertain the mutual intent of the parties at the time they executed the contract. Int’l Marine Underwriters v. ABCD Marine, LLC, 179 Wn.2d 274, 282, 313 P.3d 395 (2013). Washington follows the “objective manifestation theory” of contract interpretation, under which the focus is on the reasonable meaning of the contract language to determine the parties’ intent. Hearst Commc’ns, Inc. v. Seattle Times Co., 154 Wn.2d 493, 503, 115 P.3d 262 (2005). “We generally give words in a contract their ordinary, usual, and popular meaning unless the entirety of the agreement clearly demonstrates a contrary intent.” Hearst, 154 Wn.2d at 504. And we view the contract as a whole, interpreting particular language in the context of other contract provisions. See Weyerhaeuser Co. v. Commercial Union Ins. Co., 142 Wn.2d 654, 669-70, 15 P.3d 115 (2000). “To assist in determining the meaning of contract language, we also apply the “context rule” adopted in Berg, 115 Wn.2d at 666-69. This rule allows examination of the context surrounding a contract’s execution, including the consideration of extrinsic evidence...