by John J. Tollefsen | Nov 3, 2016 | Blog, Civil Litigation WA, Fraud WA, Insurance, Whistleblowing WA
ONE-YEAR STATUE OF LIMITATIONS – EMBEZZLEMENT Copy of case: (Travelers Casualty & Surety Co., v. Washington Trust Bank, No 92483-0) 1611-travelers-casualty-surety-co-v-washington-trust-bank Often the only hope of financial recovery from an embezzlement, other than from insurance policies, is from a bank which paid on forged endorsements (also spelled “indorsements”). A recent case (November 3, 2016) held that the statute of limitations in such cases is only one year in Washington State.1Travelers Casualty & Surety Co., v. Washington Trust Bank, No 92483-0 An employee of a nonprofit serving disabled adult client~ used her position to embezzle more than half a million dollars held by the nonprofit for its clients. She did this by drawing checks from the nonprofit’s account payable to its clients, signing the back of those checks with her own signature, and cashing them at the nonprofit’s local bank. The embezzlement was discovered in an admission in the employee’s suicide note. The Bank sent monthly bank statements during the embezzlement period. These statements included copies of the fronts of the checks that had been cashed at the Bank. The statements did not include copies of the backs of the checks, which would have readily revealed the embezzler’s signature. During the relevant period of time, the victim could access its checking account online at any time to view both the front and backs of checks that cleared its account. The online process required clicking an account to view, clicking a link for the front of the check, clicking a link for the back of the check, closing the check, and repeating as necessary. RCW 62A.4-406(f) provides: “Without regard to care or lack...
by John J. Tollefsen | Dec 12, 2015 | Blog, Civil Litigation WA, Consumer Protection WA, Contracts WA, Employment Law WA, Fraud WA, Securities Law WA
SANDRA C. THORNELL, on behalf of herself and an others similarly situated, Plaintiff, v SEATTLE SERVICE BUREAU, INC. d/b/a) NATIONAL SERVICE BUREAU, INC., and STATE FARM MUTUAL AUTOMOBILE INSURANCE COMPANY,) Defendants. copy of decision: 151210 Thornell v Seattle Service Bureau “This case involves two certified questions from the United States District Court for the Western District of Washington. First, we are asked to determine whether the Washington Consumer Protection Act (CPA), chapter 19.86 RCW allows a cause of action for a plaintiff residing outside Washington to sue a Washington corporate defendant for allegedly deceptive acts. Second, we are asked to determine whether the CPA supports a cause of action for an out-of-state plaintiff to sue an out-of-state defendant for the allegedly deceptive acts of its instate agent. The United States District Court noted an absence of Washington case law providing guidance on these issues. We answer both certified questions in the affirmative.” “We first focus on the definition of “commerce” – “any commerce directly or indirectly affecting the people of the state of Washington.” RCW 19.86.010(2) (emphasis added). The definition of “commerce” does not describe who may sue under the CPA but rather the scope of the acts and practices the CPA is designed to prevent. Defendants argue that the definition of “commerce” should not be understood to allow a claim for an unfair or deceptive practice on behalf of people not “of the state of Washington.” Such a reading, however, would require us to give no effect to the words “indirectly affecting.” In order to give effect to the phrase “indirectly affecting,” claims are not limited to those only having...
by Justin Tollefsen | May 29, 2015 | Attorneys, Blog, Civil Litigation WA, Constitution WA
On May 28, 2015, in Davis v Cox, the Washington State Supreme Court invalidated the Washington Anti-SLAPP statute, RCW 4.24.525. In a unanimous decision, the Court found that section (4)(b) of statute unconstitutionally violates the right to a jury trial. The Court further held that, because every other section in RCW 4.24.525 is dependent upon section (4)(b), the provision is nonseverable and the statute is invalid as a whole. The Washington Anti-SLAPP statute was adopted to address and dissuade “lawsuits brought primarily to chill the valid exercise of the constitutional rights of freedom of speech and petition for the redress of grievances”. A defendant may file a special motion to strike any “action involving public participation and petition”. If the action is found to involve “public participation and petition”, the responding party must “establish by clear and convincing evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim”. If the moving party prevails, the statute contains a provision for a mandatory $10,000 civil penalty and attorney fees for instituting a lawsuit in violation of the statute. The focus of the Court’s decision was the standard of proof placed upon the party responding to a special motion to strike. The responding party must “establish by clear and convincing evidence a probability of prevailing on the claim”. The Court held that the statutory language requires a trial judge to make factual findings and adjudicate the claim. Article I, Section 21 of the Washington State Constitution states, “The right of trial by jury shall remain inviolate”. The Court noted that, “At its core, the right of trial by jury guarantees litigants the right to...
by John J. Tollefsen | Feb 6, 2015 | Blog, Civil Litigation WA, Constitution WA, Constitutional US, Consumer Protection WA
State v LG Electronics, Wash app, div 1, January 12, 2015:150112 State-v-LG-Electronics There has been ongoing debate in the courts over how much contact foreign manufacturers must have with a state for the state court to assert personal jurisdiction over foreign manufacturers and make the foreign manufactures defend in the state’s courts. The state’s power is constrained by the due process clause of the Fourteenth Amendment. The foundational case is International Shoe Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310 (1945), in which the United States Supreme Court] held that a state may authorize its courts to exercise personal jurisdiction over an out-at-state defendant if the defendant has “certain minimum contacts with [the state] such that the maintenance of the suit does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice.” The courts have subsequently developed two concepts of personal jurisdiction: (1) General Jurisdiction and (2) Specific Jurisdiction. General jurisdiction “permits the exercise of personal jurisdiction over a nonresident defendant where the defendant’s ‘continuous corporate operations within a state (are] so substantial and of such a nature as to justify suit against it on causes of action arising from dealings entirely distinct from those activities.'” Daimler AG v Bauman, 134 S. Ct. at 754-55 (2014). Specific jurisdiction, which since International Shoe “has become the centerpiece of modern jurisdictional theory,” requires that suit arise out of or relate to the defendant’s contacts with the forum. Daimler, 134 S. ct. at 754-55. Specific Jurisdiction requires proof of three elements (1) minimum contacts; (2) action “arises” from minimum contacts; and (3) asserting jurisdiction does not offend traditional notions of fair play and substantial justice. In State v LG...
by John J. Tollefsen | Oct 2, 2014 | Blog, Civil Litigation WA, Constitution WA, Constitutional US
Failla v FixtureOne Corporation (SC WA, October 2, 2014 Decision: 141002-Failla-v-FixtureOne In a dispute over unpaid wages, Washington State’s Supreme Court held that personal jurisdiction can exist over an out of state officer who had never set foot in Washington State. “[E]mploying a Washington resident to perform work in Washington constitutes the “transaction of any business within this state” under RCW 4.28.185( 1)( a)”. “we do not hold today that any corporate officer of a nonresident corporation may be subject to the state’s jurisdiction. Rather, Schutz was the officer directly responsible for the hiring, firing, promotion, and payment of Failla’s wages”. Schultz was sued under RCW 49.52.050 and .070. Together these statutes create a cause of action against [a]ny employer or officer, vice principal or agent ojany employer . .. who … [w]ilfully and with intent to deprive the employee of any part of his or her wages, [pays] any employee a lower wage than the wage such employer is obligated to pay such employee by any statute, ordinance, or contract. RCW 49.52.050(2) The sole dissent argued: “The United States Supreme Court has “consistently rejected attempts to satisfy the defendant-focused ‘minimum contacts’ inquiry by demonstrating contacts between the plaintiff (or third parties) and the forum State.” ld. (emphasis added). In fact, no matter how “significant the plaintiff’s contacts with the forum may be,” they cannot be decisive when determining whether the defendant had minimum contacts. ld. As described above, the employer’s only contacts with Washington were his contacts with the plairitiff. He took no actions related to this state. The majority’s inquiry is focused on the defendant’s contact with the plaintiff,...
by John J. Tollefsen | Sep 10, 2014 | Blog, Civil Litigation, Civil Litigation WA
Kathryn Learner Family Trust v. Wilson, 2014 Wash. App. LEXIS 2196 (Wash. Ct. App., Div. 3, Sept. 4, 2014) Decision: 140904-Learner-v-Wilson It has long been the common law rule that a plaintiff must give notice to the defendant of the type of damages it is seeking. Prior to the advent of “notice pleading” the defendant had the right to notice of the amount of damages. The rule developed that “general damages” did not need pled. General damages are those which are the “natural and necessary result of the wrongful act or omission asserted as the basis for liability. They are presumed by or implied in law to have resulted from the injury.”1Jensen v. Torr, 44 Wn. App. 207, 214, 721 P.2d 992 (1986). Attorney fees were considered “costs” but the meaning of “costs” changed over time through statutory construction and judicial decision as American courts moved from their British roots. Under federal law, attorney fees arising under a contract2If the attorney fees are from another source like a statute or are part of the cause of action, the rule probably is not applicable are special damages that must be pled under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(g).3United Indus., Inc. v. Simon-Hartley, Ltd., 91 F.3d 762, 764 (5th Cir. 1996) (citing Maidmore Realty Co., Inc. v. Maidmore Realty Co., Inc., 474 F.2d 840, 843 (3rd Cir. 1973) This court held that these rules have been altered in Washington by Civil Rule 54(c) which provides the except “as to a party against whom a judgment is entered by default, every final judgment shall grant the relief to which the party in whose...
